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HOW LONG IS TOO LONG?:   
CONFLICTING STATE RESPONSES  
TO DE FACTO LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE 
SENTENCES AFTER GRAHAM V. FLORIDA  
AND MILLER V. ALABAMA 
Kelly Scavone* 
 
A juvenile offender waits for sentencing while a court calculates his life 
expectancy and determines the point at which his sentence effectively 
becomes his entire life.  This is the scenario posed by recent U.S. Supreme 
Court decisions that have struck down life without parole (LWOP) 
sentences for most juvenile offenders but have left open the possibility of 
lengthy term-of-years sentences.  Consecutive term-of-years sentences may 
leave many juvenile offenders in prison for the majority of their lives 
despite the holdings in Miller v. Alabama and Graham v. Florida that 
juveniles are different and more capable of reform than most adult 
offenders. 
This Note examines the issues created by long term-of-years sentences or 
“virtual LWOP” after Miller and Graham.  Specifically, this Note 
addresses the (1) unconstitutionality of virtual LWOP sentences under 
Graham; and (2) inconsistencies created between sentences given to 
homicide and nonhomicide juvenile offenders after Miller.  Ultimately, this 
Note analyzes statutory responses to juvenile LWOP sentences and 
proposes that either parole restrictions for juveniles must be removed 
entirely or comprehensive statutory schemes must be enacted to provide 
multiple opportunities for release. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution prohibits cruel and 
unusual punishment.1  In recent years, courts have become increasingly 
concerned with the Eighth Amendment in the context of juvenile 
sentencing.  These concerns culminated in a series of U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions that questioned the validity of imposing the highest forms of 
punishment on juvenile offenders.2  In 2010, the Supreme Court 
categorically banned life without parole (LWOP) for juvenile offenders 
convicted of nonhomicide offenses.3  In 2012, the Supreme Court in Miller 
v. Alabama struck down mandatory LWOP sentences for juvenile homicide 
offenders.4  The Court found mandatory LWOP sentences to be an 
unconstitutional violation of the Eighth Amendment.5  Unlike in Miller’s 
predecessor, Graham v. Florida,6 the Supreme Court in Miller did not 
impose a categorical ban on LWOP sentences for nonhomicide juvenile 
offenders.7  Instead, the Court left open the possibility that the worst 
juvenile homicide offenders may be deserving of an LWOP sentence but 
closed the door on any sentencing schemes that include a mandatory LWOP 
sentence for juveniles.8 
The narrow holding of Miller has left several residual questions 
regarding the future of juvenile sentencing and how states should 
incorporate both the Miller and Graham decisions into their sentencing 
structure.9  Specifically, state courts have dealt with the question of lengthy 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 2. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 
(2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 3. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034. 
 4. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2457–58. 
 5. Id. at 2460. 
 6. 130 S. Ct. 2011. 
 7. See infra Part I.C. 
 8. See infra Part I.C. 
 9. See Krisztina Schlessel, Note, Graham’s Applicability to Term-of-Years Sentences 
and Mandate To Provide a “Meaningful Opportunity” for Release, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
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term-of-years sentences given to both nonhomicide and homicide juveniles 
that are essentially synonymous with LWOP sentences, given the young age 
of the offenders.10  These lengthy term-of-years sentences constitute virtual 
or de facto LWOP sentences that may pose the same constitutional 
questions for juveniles as mandatory LWOP sentences.11 
Responses in state courts to the issue of virtual LWOP sentences after 
Miller and Graham have varied significantly.12  Some state courts, 
including those of California and Iowa, have held that based on the distinct 
characteristics of juvenile offenders that result in diminished culpability, 
Miller and Graham must apply equally to both LWOP and virtual LWOP 
sentences given to juvenile homicide offenders.13  These courts have 
focused on the spirit of both Miller and Graham, which insists on a 
“meaningful opportunity to obtain release” for all juvenile offenders.14 
However, other state courts, including those of Florida and Louisiana, 
have adopted a different reading of Miller and Graham.15  These states, 
examining virtual LWOP sentences of nonhomicide offenders, have upheld 
lengthy sentences that amount to the equivalent of LWOP sentences.16  
State courts in Florida and Louisiana have applied only the holding of 
Graham and have held that virtual LWOP sentences do not fall under the 
ban against LWOP sentences for juvenile nonhomicide offenders.17  This 
has resulted in a scenario where a court might strike down mandatory 
LWOP sentences for juvenile homicide offenders but uphold virtual LWOP 
sentences for juvenile nonhomicide offenders.18  This dichotomy has 
resulted in punishments that are seemingly disproportionate with not only 
the age of the offenders but also with the crimes that they have committed.  
In light of the Supreme Court decisions that have held LWOP sentences to 
be disproportionate punishment for the vast majority of juvenile offenders, 
sentences that keep juveniles in prison for the majority or entirety of their 
lives seem disproportionate with the diminished culpability of youths. 
Several states have reformed their sentencing statutes to comply with 
Miller and Graham.19  States including California and Wyoming have 
removed parole restrictions on sentences given to all juvenile offenders, 
 
1027, 1037–38 (2013) (“The first issue is whether Graham applies to a lengthy term-of-
years-without-parole sentence . . . .  The second issue Graham leaves unresolved concerns 
the manner in which states can achieve compliance with its holding.”).  In addition to the 
question of how Miller and Graham should impact term-of-years sentences, many states 
have grappled with whether the Miller decision should be applied retroactively. See Marsha 
L. Levick & Robert G. Schwartz, Practical Implications of Miller and Jackson:  Obtaining 
Relief in Court and Before the Parole Board, 31 LAW & INEQ. 369, 374–75 (2013). 
 10. See, e.g., People v. Caballero, 282 P.3d 291 (Cal. 2012); State v. Brown, 118 So. 3d 
332 (La. 2013). 
 11. See infra Part II. 
 12. See infra Part II. 
 13. See infra Part II.A. 
 14. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2033 (2010). 
 15. See infra Part II.B. 
 16. See infra Part II.B. 
 17. See infra Part II.B. 
 18. See infra Part II.B. 
 19. See infra Part III. 
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regardless of the offense committed.20  Juvenile offenders sentenced to 
LWOP or life imprisonment become eligible for parole after a certain 
number of years behind bars.21  The time served ranges from fifteen years 
in California, after which the offender may petition a sentencing court for 
recall and resentencing, to thirty-five years in Louisiana for juvenile 
homicide offenders.22  Although these sentencing schemes comport with 
Miller’s holding and offer juveniles originally sentenced to LWOP an 
opportunity to demonstrate parole eligibility, these statutes only apply to 
LWOP or life sentences and do not take lengthy term-of-years sentences 
into account.23  Juvenile offenders are only considered under these statutes 
if they have specifically been sentenced to LWOP or life imprisonment, as 
indicated in the legislation.24  Any mandatory sentencing scheme that 
results in virtual LWOP sentences without parole eligibility does not fall 
under these statutes. 
An adequate response to the issue of virtual LWOP sentences may lie in 
sentencing reform similar to a juvenile sentencing statute in Montana.  The 
Montana statute,25 although enacted before both Graham and Miller, could 
potentially address both LWOP and virtual LWOP sentences.26  In 
Montana, any offenders who were convicted of a crime committed before 
the age of eighteen are exempted from both LWOP sentences and sentences 
with restrictions on parole eligibility.27  These exemptions apply to all 
juvenile offenders regardless of the nature of the offense committed.28  This 
ensures that juveniles are given an opportunity for release before spending 
lengthy sentences in prison that result in either geriatric release or no 
release at all.29 
California has enacted comprehensive statutory reform, both in response 
to Miller’s ban on mandatory LWOP sentences and to virtual LWOP 
sentences.30  The California state legislature recently passed statutory 
revisions that will enable juvenile offenders, both homicide and 
nonhomicide, to petition for parole after serving between fifteen and 
twenty-five years of a lengthy term-of-years sentence.31  This statutory 
scheme uses the same rationale as legislative reform for LWOP offenders in 
Louisiana and Wyoming and applies it to virtual LWOP sentences.  Both 
the California and Montana statutes pose possible solutions to the issue of 
virtual LWOP sentences after Graham and Miller. 
 
 20. See infra Part III. 
 21. See infra Part III. 
 22. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(d)(2)(A)(i) (West Supp. 2014); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 15:574.4(D) (2013). 
 23. See infra Part III. 
 24. See infra Part III. 
 25. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-222 (West Supp. 2013). 
 26. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 27. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 28. See MONT. CODE ANN § 46-18-222. 
 29. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 30. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 31. See infra Part III.B.2. 
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This Note discusses the “children are different”32 rationale behind Miller 
through which the various state responses can be analyzed.  Ultimately, this 
Note proposes that lengthy term-of-years sentences be viewed through the 
same lens as LWOP sentences primarily due to the emphasis in Miller on 
the need for individualized sentencing in juvenile cases, which considers 
the mitigating characteristics of youth.  Although virtual LWOP sentences 
are not categorically barred for juvenile homicide offenders under Miller, 
lengthy sentences without parole eligibility create the exact result that the 
Court was trying to avoid in Miller and Graham.  Juveniles must be 
afforded individualized sentencing that accounts for the mitigating factors 
of youth and, in the majority of cases, must be given an opportunity to 
reenter society before spending their entire lives behind bars. 
Part I of this Note discusses the background of juvenile sentencing under 
the Eighth Amendment, culminating in the Miller decision in 2012.  Part II 
addresses responses to Graham and Miller in state courts and the 
inconsistencies in juvenile sentencing that Miller created.  Part III discusses 
statutory responses to Graham and Miller and how the majority of 
legislative approaches to juvenile offenders are inadequate.  Finally, this 
Note proposes that state legislatures develop a more streamlined response to 
the issue of juvenile parole such as those seen in Montana and California.33  
State courts and legislatures must implement the rationale behind Miller 
and its predecessors in order to ensure that juveniles obtain the opportunity 
for release during their lifetimes.34 
I.  THE HISTORY OF JUVENILE SENTENCING  
AND LWOP UNDER THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
This Part provides an overview of recent juvenile sentencing cases in the 
Supreme Court and the rationale that led the Court to strike down 
mandatory LWOP sentences for juvenile homicide offenders in Miller.  Part 
I.A gives a brief overview of the Eighth Amendment and how courts 
analyze it with regard to cruel and unusual punishment.  Part I.B discusses 
Roper v. Simmons35 and Graham, the two cases leading up to Miller.  These 
two cases established the “juveniles are different” framework that guided 
the majority decision in Miller.  Part I.C provides an in-depth look at the 
Miller decision and how the holding poses potential problems in application 
in both state courts and legislatures. 
 
 
 32. See generally Ioana Tchoukleva, Note, Children Are Different:  Bridging the Gap 
Between Rhetoric and Reality Post Miller v. Alabama, 4 CALIF. L. REV. 92 (2013) (urging 
courts to adhere to the rationale that youth is a mitigating factor in juvenile sentencing 
practices). 
 33. See infra Part III. 
 34. See infra Part III. 
 35. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
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A.  The Eighth Amendment Bars Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
The Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states, “Excessive bail 
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted.”36  This constitutional protection guarantees “the 
right not to be subjected to excessive sanctions.”37  The Eighth Amendment 
stems from the concept that punishment must be “graduated” and 
“proportioned” to the offense so as to accomplish justice.38  Recently, the 
Supreme Court has adopted a more narrow proportionality principle.39  To 
violate the Eighth Amendment, a particular sentence must be “grossly 
disproportionate” to the crime committed.40  If the sentence appears to be 
grossly disproportionate on its face, a court may consider sentences that 
other offenders in the same jurisdiction received for similar crimes, as well 
as sentences given in other jurisdictions.41  If the sentence is 
disproportionate in comparison, the court may find that the sentence 
violates the Eighth Amendment as cruel and unusual punishment.42 
In addition, an analysis of punishment under the Eighth Amendment 
considers whether the sanction is proportional to the offender.43  
Specifically, the Supreme Court has been concerned with “mismatches 
between the culpability of a class of offenders and the severity of a 
penalty.”44  Recently, this consideration has led the Supreme Court to 
categorically ban certain types of punishment for specific groups of 
offenders.45  Specifically, the Supreme Court found capital punishment 
unconstitutional for mentally retarded and juvenile offenders based on the 
lack of sufficient culpability in both groups.46 
Another crucial consideration under the Eighth Amendment is the 
“evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society.”47  The Supreme Court considers societal opinions reflected in 
objective criteria48 as to whether a particular punishment is outdated or 
 
 36. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 37. Roper, 543 U.S. at 560. 
 38. Id. (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910)).  Although the 
proportionality analysis remains crucial to considerations of punishment under the Eighth 
Amendment, scholars have noted that the concept of proportionality is entirely dependent on 
the different justifications for punishment. See Kevin Cole, The Empty Idea of Sentencing 
Disparity, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1336, 1336 (1997) (arguing that an analysis of disparities in 
sentences must consider the justifications for punishment). 
 39. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2021 (2010). 
 40. Id. (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 997 (1991)). 
 41. Id. at 2022. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2463 (2012). 
 44. Id. 
 45. See generally Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding capital punishment 
for juvenile offenders unconstitutional); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) 
(categorically banning capital punishment for mentally retarded offenders). 
 46. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 47. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976)). 
 48. This criteria includes state legislation and any patterns or changes in societal 
standards. See id. at 2470. 
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rejected by the majority of state legislatures.49  The Supreme Court also 
looks to national consensus, most often tallying up state laws to garner the 
level of support, or lack thereof, for the considered punishment.50  In 
addition, reviewing courts look beyond enacted legislation and examine the 
practice of imposing the punishment and to what extent society has been 
willing to carry out that punishment.51  Societal consensus and 
proportionality are the key concerns for courts in the analysis of sentencing 
under the Eighth Amendment. 
B.  Roper v. Simmons and Graham v. Florida Consider Juvenile Culpability 
and Potential for Reform 
Part I.B gives a background for the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller.  
Part I.B.1 explains the two lines of precedent regarding the Eighth 
Amendment that converged with Graham and later Miller.  Part I.B.2 
explains the holding in Roper, a landmark case that paved the way for the 
Court in Graham.  Part I.B.3 discusses Graham, the case immediately 
preceding Miller in which the Supreme Court created the “juveniles are 
different” rationale that ultimately framed its decision to strike down 
mandatory LWOP sentences for juvenile homicide offenders. 
1.  Two Lines of Precedent Converge When the Supreme Court Is 
Confronted with Severe Forms of Punishment for Juvenile Offenders 
The Graham and Miller decisions represent the convergence of two lines 
of precedent in Supreme Court sentencing cases.  The first line of precedent 
struck down sentencing practices that resulted in overly harsh sentences 
despite the diminished culpability of the offenders.52  These cases adopted a 
policy of individualized sentencing by “consider[ing] all of the 
circumstances of the case to determine whether the sentence is 
unconstitutionally excessive.”53  Under this analysis, the concept of 
proportionality became key as the Court “compar[ed] the gravity of the 
offense and the severity of the sentence.”54 
The second line of cases used categorical rules to analyze punishment 
under the Eighth Amendment based on the nature of either the offender or 
the offense.55  This string of precedent struck down death penalty sentences 
for the least culpable offenders, namely juveniles and those “whose 
intellectual functioning is in a low range.”56 
 
 49. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2023 (2010). 
 50. Id. (“[T]he ‘clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is 
the legislation enacted by the country’s legislatures.’” (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312)). 
 51. Id. (noting that although juvenile LWOP for nonhomicide offenders was a legal 
sentence in a majority of states, the practice of imposing that sentence was highly rare). 
 52. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463. 
 53. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2021. 
 54. Id. at 2022. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
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The two lines of precedent met when the Supreme Court was faced with 
the issues surrounding life imprisonment for juvenile offenders.57  The 
cases immediately preceding Miller analogized LWOP sentences to the 
death penalty for juvenile offenders.58  Thus, the need for individualized 
sentencing in death penalty cases and the emphasis on “consider[ing] the 
‘mitigating qualities of youth’” led the Miller Court to strike down 
mandatory LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders.59  These two categories 
of cases converged with regards to the sentencing of juvenile offenders 
“because of their lesser culpability.”60  Two landmark cases, Roper and 
Graham, established the framework for considering LWOP sentences for 
juvenile offenders under the Eighth Amendment and paved the way for the 
Miller decision. 
2.  Juveniles Are Different:  The Supreme Court Strikes Down the Death 
Penalty for Juvenile Offenders in Roper v. Simmons 
In 2005, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of death 
penalty sentences for juvenile offenders in Roper.61  The Court previously 
faced this issue in Stanford v. Kentucky62 and held that capital punishment 
did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment for juvenile offenders 
between the ages of fifteen and eighteen.63  Roper overturned the Stanford 
decision and created a categorical ban on capital punishment for juvenile 
offenders under the age of eighteen.64  The Court held that the death penalty 
was disproportionate punishment for juveniles and thus constituted cruel 
and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.65 
The Court noted, “Capital punishment must be limited to those offenders 
who commit ‘a narrow category of the most serious crimes’ and whose 
extreme culpability makes them ‘the most deserving of execution.’”66  
Roper established the principle that due to their lesser culpability, juveniles 
must be treated differently for sentencing purposes.67  The Court outlined 
three general distinctions between juveniles and adults that placed juvenile 
offenders squarely outside the boundaries of those exceptional offenders 
deserving the death penalty.68 
 
 57. See id. at 2021–23. 
 58. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2463 (2012). 
 59. Id. at 2467 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)). 
 60. Id. at 2463. 
 61. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 62. 492 U.S. 361 (1989). 
 63. Id. at 380. 
 64. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578–79; see also Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2038 
(2010) (“More recently, in Roper . . . we extended the prohibition on executions to those 
who committed their crimes before the age of 18.”). 
 65. Roper, 543 U.S. at 575. 
 66. Id. at 568 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002)). 
 67. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026 (“Roper established that because juveniles have lessened 
culpability they are less deserving of the most severe punishments.”). 
 68. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70. 
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First, juveniles are decidedly immature and irresponsible.69  As a result, 
adolescents as a whole are more inclined toward reckless behavior and rash 
decisions.70  This reality is reflected in society’s laws that prohibit juvenile 
participation in certain adult activities.71  Thus, juvenile conduct is not as 
“morally reprehensible” as that of an adult and cannot be punished in the 
same manner.72 
This immaturity played a significant role in the Court’s second 
distinction about juveniles as a class of offenders.73  The Roper decision 
highlighted that juveniles are “more vulnerable or susceptible to negative 
influences and outside pressures.”74  The Court equated this vulnerability 
with a lack of control over one’s surroundings and thus an inability to resist 
potentially criminal influences.75  Culpability is diminished if one’s 
decisions are more likely to be outside the control of the offender.76 
The third characteristic of juveniles that the Court discussed is the 
underdeveloped character of a juvenile as compared to an adult.77  This 
transient character of juveniles indicates that the recklessness and 
susceptibility evident in the first two characteristics are subject to change.78  
In this regard, Roper emphasized the greater possibility for reform in 
juvenile offenders.79 
When viewed as a whole, these three character traits evident in juveniles 
create the presumption that juvenile offenders can never be among those 
most deserving of capital punishment.80  Although the Court noted that 
drawing categorical lines always poses difficulties, society’s decision to 
create its own categorical distinctions at the age of eighteen indicates that a 
line can be drawn with regard to capital punishment.81 
 
 69. Id. at 569. 
 70. See Jeffrey Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescence:  A Developmental 
Perspective, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 339, 341 (1992) (noting that the “sensation seeking” 
and “egocentrism” associated with adolescence as a developmental phase lead to 
recklessness); see also Barry C. Feld, Adolescent Criminal Responsibility, Proportionality, 
and Sentencing Policy:  Roper, Graham, Miller/Jackson, and the Youth Discount, 31 LAW & 
INEQ. 263, 284 (2013) (“To assess risks, a person has to be able to identify potential 
outcomes, estimate their likelihood of occurring, and make valuations of possible 
consequences.  Adolescents underestimate the amount and likelihood of risks, emphasize 
immediate outcomes, and focus on gains rather than losses to a greater extent than do 
adults.”). 
 71. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (“In recognition of the comparative immaturity and 
irresponsibility of juveniles, almost every State prohibits those under 18 years of age from 
voting, serving on juries, or marrying without parental consent.”). 
 72. Id. at 570 (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988)). 
 73. Id. at 569. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 570. 
 76. Id. at 569–70. 
 77. Id. at 570. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 572–73 (“The differences between juvenile and adult offenders are too marked 
and well understood to risk allowing a youthful person to receive the death penalty despite 
insufficient culpability.”). 
 81. Id. at 574. 
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As stated above, analysis of punishment under the Eighth Amendment 
includes an assessment of “evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society.”82  Accordingly, a major factor in the Roper 
decision was an evolution in the states with regard to capital punishment for 
juvenile offenders since the Stanford decision.83  The Court compared this 
change to the evolution of state laws concerning the death penalty for the 
mentally retarded.84  On the same day that the Stanford decision came 
down, the Supreme Court held in Perry v. Lynaugh85 that capital 
punishment for mentally retarded offenders did not amount to cruel and 
unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.86  When the Court 
reconsidered this issue in Atkins v. Virginia,87 the evolving standards of 
decency, measured by changes in state practices, led the Court to hold that 
death penalty sentences for the mentally retarded did, in fact, constitute 
cruel and unusual punishment.88 
Similarly, the Roper Court looked to changing attitudes toward juvenile 
offenders and the death penalty through “objective indicia,” including state 
laws and common practices.89  Although less dramatic than the societal 
shift seen with capital punishment for the mentally retarded, the Court 
noted that the direction of state practices and laws indicated a consistent 
shift away from executing juvenile offenders.90 
3.  Applying Roper Outside of Capital Punishment:   
The Supreme Court Holds LWOP for Juvenile Nonhomicide  
Offenders Unconstitutional in Graham v. Florida 
The framework established in Roper became the basis for the landmark 
Graham decision to ban LWOP sentences for nonhomicide juvenile 
offenders.91  The Graham Court first indicated that LWOP sentences are 
analogous to capital punishment for juvenile offenders.92  Capital 
punishment and LWOP share characteristics that are “shared by no other 
sentences.”93  The Court noted that LWOP sentences are especially harsh 
 
 82. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2463 (2012) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 
86, 101 (1958)). 
 83. Roper, 543 U.S. at 565 (“Five States that allowed the juvenile death penalty at the 
time of Stanford have abandoned it in the intervening 15 years—four through legislative 
enactments and one through judicial decision.”). 
 84. Id. at 564–65. 
 85. 492 U.S. 302 (1989). 
 86. See id. at 335. 
 87. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 88. Roper, 543 U.S. at 563. 
 89. Id. at 563–64. 
 90. Id. at 566 (“Since Stanford, no State that previously prohibited capital punishment 
for juveniles has reinstated it.  This fact, coupled with the trend toward abolition of the 
juvenile death penalty, carries special force in light of the general popularity of anticrime 
legislation.”). 
 91. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2022 (2010). 
 92. Id. at 2027 (“[L]ife without parole sentences share some characteristics with death 
sentences that are shared by no other sentences . . . [both sentences alter] the offender’s life 
by a forfeiture that is irrevocable.”). 
 93. Id. 
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for juvenile offenders when “a juvenile offender will on average serve more 
years and a greater percentage of his life in prison than an adult offender.”94  
Both the death penalty and LWOP constitute a denial of any hope of release 
or restoration into society.95  Thus, the analysis of Graham proceeded to 
evaluate LWOP sentences under a similar framework as previously used in 
Roper.96 
The Graham opinion went on to deny any penological justifications for 
LWOP sentences for juvenile nonhomicide offenders.97  Using the distinct 
characteristics of juveniles outlined in Roper, the Court determined that 
LWOP for juvenile nonhomicide offenders is incompatible with effective 
retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation.98  As the Court stated in 
Graham, retribution is a theory of punishment that is based upon the idea 
that “[s]ociety is entitled to impose severe sanctions on a[n] . . . offender to 
express its condemnation of the crime and to seek restoration of the moral 
imbalance caused by the offense.”99  Retribution is not an appropriate 
justification when the sentence imposed is disproportional with the 
culpability of the offender.100  As first articulated in Roper, “[r]etribution is 
not proportional if the law’s most severe penalty is imposed on one whose 
culpability or blameworthiness is diminished, to a substantial degree, by 
reason of youth and immaturity.”101  Moreover, Graham stated that the 
justification for retribution was further diminished in cases where the 
juvenile offenders were not convicted of homicide.102  Retribution therefore 
does not justify LWOP sentences given the diminished culpability of 
juveniles combined with the diminished culpability of nonhomicide 
offenders.103 
Turning to the deterrence justification, Graham noted that any deterrent 
effect of LWOP sentences was insufficient given the immaturity of juvenile 
offenders.104  Punishment is justified under the deterrence theory if 
offenders are likely to consider the potential punishment prior to acting.105  
The recklessness associated with juvenile behavior discussed in both Roper 
and Graham indicates that “[juveniles] are less likely to take a possible 
punishment into consideration when making decisions.”106  Thus, 
deterrence has a diminished effect when dealing with juvenile offenders.107  
 
 94. Id. at 2028. 
 95. Id. at 2027. 
 96. Id. at 2027–28. 
 97. Id. at 2028. 
 98. Id. at 2028–29. 
 99. Id. at 2028. 
 100. Id. (“‘The heart of the retribution rationale is that a criminal sentence must be 
directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal offender.’” (quoting Tison v. 
Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987))). 
 101. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005). 
 102. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 2028–29. 
 107. Id. at 2029. 
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The Court further noted that deterrence is even less likely when the 
punishment in question is rarely imposed.108  Even assuming that there is a 
minimal deterrent effect of LWOP on nonhomicide offenders, Graham held 
that even limited deterrence is insufficient to justify LWOP based on the 
gross disproportionality of the sentence.109 
Finally, incapacitation does not form a satisfactory justification for 
LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders.110  The theory of incapacitation 
rests on the belief that criminals should be incarcerated to prevent future 
crime.111  In the case of LWOP, incapacitation suggests that the “offender 
forever will be a danger to society” and thus must be incarcerated 
permanently.112  For a court to justify permanent incapacitation, there must 
be some consensus that the offender is incorrigible and therefore must be 
removed from society.113  However, the characteristics of youth indicate 
that reform is more probable for juvenile offenders.114  In fact, the transient 
qualities of juveniles make it nearly impossible for a court to determine at 
the time of sentencing that the juvenile offender will pose a threat to society 
for the entirety of his or her natural life.115  While incapacitation provides 
some justification for sentencing juvenile offenders, the Court held that the 
extent of incapacitation achieved with LWOP cannot be justified as applied 
to juvenile nonhomicide offenders.116 
The Court also noted that LWOP is impermissible for juvenile offenders 
given their potential for rehabilitation.117  Thus, rehabilitation is not an 
appropriate justification for imposing LWOP on juvenile offenders.118  In 
imposing an LWOP sentence and removing the offender from the 
community permanently, “the State makes an irrevocable judgment about 
that person’s value and place in society.”119  This irreversible judgment is 
not appropriate in light of the high probability for reform in juvenile 
offenders.120  An additional concern with LWOP in the context of 
rehabilitation is that “defendants serving life without parole sentences are 
often denied access to vocational training and other rehabilitative services 
that are available to other inmates.”121  The Court even goes so far as to say 
 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. See Mark T. Freeman, Meaningless Opportunities:  Graham v. Florida and the 
Reality of De Facto LWOP Sentences, 44 MCGEORGE L. REV. 961, 979 (2013) (“The 
incapacitation theory of punishment suggests that a state should imprison some criminals so 
that those individuals do not commit more crimes.”). 
 112. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2029. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. (“To justify life without parole on the assumption that the juvenile offender 
forever will be a danger to society requires the sentencer to make a judgment that the 
juvenile is incorrigible.  The characteristics of juveniles make that judgment questionable.”). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 2030. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
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that the lack of rehabilitative services available for LWOP inmates factors 
into the proportionality of the sentence.122  The incompatibility of LWOP 
and rehabilitation further adds to the Court’s determination that LWOP for 
juvenile nonhomicide offenders is grossly disproportionate and thus cruel 
and unusual punishment.123 
Justice Thomas, joined in part by Justice Scalia and Justice Alito, wrote a 
dissenting opinion in Graham.124  Justice Thomas’s dissent argued that the 
Court should not make these moral judgments on juvenile sentencing when 
“Congress, the District of Columbia, and 37 States allow judges and juries 
to consider this sentencing practice in juvenile nonhomicide cases.”125  
Justice Thomas argued that the majority highly overstates any evolution in 
state courts and legislatures regarding LWOP sentencing.126  He noted that 
state legislatures should ultimately decide the proportionality of an 
offense.127  Despite the majority’s argument that only 123 juvenile 
offenders were serving LWOP for nonhomicide offenses at the time of the 
opinion, Justice Thomas stated that both objective societal indicia and the 
evolving standards of decency indicated that public opinion supported the 
possibility that some juvenile nonhomicide offenders should serve 
LWOP.128  In addition to the large majority of states with LWOP sentences, 
Justice Thomas’s dissent noted that “states over the past 20 years have 
consistently increased the severity of punishments for juvenile 
offenders.”129  In Justice Thomas’s view, the rare imposition of LWOP did 
not negate the strong consensus among state legislatures that the sentence 
should remain available to those juveniles most deserving of LWOP.130 
Justice Alito, in his own dissenting opinion in Graham, briefly touched 
on the issue of lengthy term-of-years sentences.131  Justice Alito noted that 
the majority’s holding applied to LWOP sentences alone, stating, “Nothing 
in the Court’s opinion affects the imposition of a sentence to a term of years 
without the possibility of parole.”132  Justice Alito followed the rationale 
that Graham’s narrow holding did not reach outside the strict LWOP 
sentence despite rhetoric to the contrary in the Graham opinion—an 
approach that was later employed by state courts faced with imposing 
virtual LWOP sentences.133 
 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 2043 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 125. Id. 
 126. See id. at 2048–49. 
 127. Id. at 2045. 
 128. Id. at 2048–49. 
 129. Id. at 2050 (citations omitted). 
 130. Id. at 2051. 
 131. Id. at 2058 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 132. Id. (“Indeed, petitioner conceded at oral argument that a sentence of as much as 40 
years without the possibility of parole [likely] would be constitutional.”). 
 133. See infra Part II. 
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C.  Extending the “Juveniles Are Different” Framework to Homicide 
Offenses:  Miller v. Alabama 
Part I.C.1 gives an overview of the Court’s rationale in Miller and how 
Graham and Roper set the stage for the ultimate holding.  Part I.C.2 
discusses the two dissenting opinions in Miller that form important 
counterarguments to the ban on mandatory LWOP for juvenile homicide 
offenders. 
1.  Miller Establishes the Rule That Mandatory LWOP and Juvenile 
Offenders Are Largely Incompatible and Thus Disproportionate 
Two years after the Graham decision banned LWOP sentences for 
nonhomicide juvenile offenders, the Supreme Court was faced with the 
issue of LWOP sentences given to two juvenile offenders convicted of 
homicide.134  Both offenders were fourteen at the time that they committed 
the crime.135  In both instances, the sentencing court did not have any 
discretion in imposing an LWOP sentence.136  Using the framework 
established in Graham, the Court struck down mandatory LWOP sentences 
for juvenile homicide offenders.137 
Miller applied the concept articulated in Graham that “youth matters” in 
juvenile sentencing when invoking the state’s harshest punishments.138  The 
analysis in Miller was centered on the premise that “none of what [Graham] 
said about children—about their distinctive (and transitory) mental traits 
and environmental vulnerabilities—is crime-specific.”139  Thus, the 
Supreme Court saw no distinction in the lesser culpability of juveniles 
between nonhomicide and homicide offenses for the purposes of what 
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.140  The Miller decision 
emphasized the need for discretion in juvenile cases, regardless of the crime 
committed.141 
The Miller decision did not create a categorical ban on LWOP sentences 
for juvenile homicide offenders.142  Instead, the Court was more concerned 
with the absence of any discretionary tactics available in mandatory 
sentencing schemes.143  “Such mandatory penalties, by their nature, 
preclude a sentencer from taking account of an offender’s age and the 
wealth of characteristics and circumstances attendant to it.”144  The Court 
noted that the lack of individualized considerations in mandatory sentencing 
 
 134. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 2465. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. (“So Graham’s reasoning implicates any life-without-parole sentence imposed on 
a juvenile, even as its categorical bar relates only to nonhomicide offenses.”). 
 141. Id. at 2466. (“[I]mposition of a State’s most severe penalties on juvenile offenders 
cannot proceed as though they were not children.”). 
 142. Id. at 2469. 
 143. Id. at 2467. 
 144. Id. 
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schemes for juveniles did not satisfy the proportionality test under the 
Eighth Amendment,145 stating: 
By requiring that all children convicted of homicide receive lifetime 
incarceration without possibility of parole, regardless of their age and age-
related characteristics and the nature of their crimes, the mandatory 
sentencing schemes before us violate this principle of proportionality, and 
so the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment.146 
Although the Court’s opinion focused on LWOP sentences in this regard, 
the analysis of mandatory sentences seemed to indicate that individualized 
sentencing that incorporates the mitigating factors of youth must always be 
used when considering harsh or lengthy sentences for juvenile offenders.147  
The Court further predicted that LWOP sentences for juveniles would 
become uncommon once courts were required to use discretion.148 
The Supreme Court considered arguments from Alabama and Arkansas 
that mandatory sentencing schemes had been upheld in the past under the 
Eighth Amendment and thus should not be struck down as cruel and 
unusual.149  The majority rejected this argument, distinguishing Miller from 
past mandatory sentencing cases.150  The Court was faced specifically with 
mandatory sentences for juvenile offenders.151  It noted, “We have by now 
held on multiple occasions that a sentencing rule permissible for adults may 
not be so for children.”152  This reiterates the rationale that children are 
different from adults in the sentencing context and indicates that any 
mandatory sentencing scheme for “society’s harshest punishments” cannot 
be imposed on juvenile offenders.153 
The Court’s views on the lack of proportionality between juvenile 
offenders and LWOP may be reflected in the nature of offenders that are 
 
 145. Id.; see also Feld, supra note 70, at 327 (“Moreover, proportionality is a retributive 
concept, not a utilitarian one, and the Court decided Roper, Graham, and Miller/Jackson 
firmly on retributive grounds—reduced culpability—even after examining the relevant 
utilitarian justifications for punishment.  Accordingly, there is no basis on which to disregard 
the categorical mitigating role of youthfulness at sentencing to incapacitate some youths who 
may be deemed to be life-course persistent offenders.”). 
 146. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475. 
 147. Id. (“[O]ur individualized sentencing decisions make clear that a judge or jury must 
have the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances before imposing the harshest 
possible penalty for juveniles.”). 
 148. Id. at 2469; see also Aryn Seiler, Buried Alive:  The Constitutional Question of Life 
Without Parole for Juvenile Offenders Convicted of Homicide, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
293, 319–20 (2013) (“It is unclear why the Court refused to extend Graham’s categorical 
rule to all juvenile offenders because the Court offered no expanded explanation.  The Court 
merely stated that it anticipated the sentence would be uncommon once courts and juries 
were required to consider age as a mitigating factor.”). 
 149. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2470.  Alabama and Arkansas cited Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 
U.S. 957 (1991), in which the Supreme Court held that a sentence was not unconstitutional 
under the Eighth Amendment simply because it was mandatory. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2470.  
The States argued that striking down mandatory LWOP for juvenile offenders would 
effectively overrule Harmelin. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
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sentenced to LWOP.154  “A review of juvenile life without parole cases 
contradicts the general assumption that these sentences are reserved only for 
the most chronically violent youth.”155  In fact, many juvenile offenders 
sentenced to LWOP were first-time offenders at the time of conviction.156  
However, the mandatory nature of state sentencing laws does not give 
judges any discretion to consider these factors, as seen in a major portion of 
the Court’s analysis in Miller.157 
2.  Dissenting Opinions in Miller Challenge 
the Validity of the Majority’s Holding 
In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Roberts wrote that the majority 
had ignored objective societal indicia that state courts and legislatures 
approved mandatory LWOP sentences for juvenile homicide offenders.158  
Under the Eighth Amendment analysis, a court must consider “‘objective 
indicia of society’s standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and 
state practice.’”159  The dissent emphasized the distinction between LWOP 
for juvenile homicide offenders and the sentences considered in the past 
under the Miller line of precedent.160  Specifically, the dissent focused on 
the subject of Graham:  LWOP sentences given to nonhomicide 
offenders.161  In Graham, the Court noted that although thirty-seven states, 
the District of Columbia, and the federal government authorized LWOP for 
nonhomicide juvenile offenders,162 the sentence was in fact incredibly 
rare.163  Chief Justice Roberts noted that, at the time of the Miller opinion, 
there were “nearly” 2,500 offenders serving LWOP for homicide offenses 
committed as juveniles, and 2,000 of these offenders received these 
sentences because they were legislatively mandated.164  Thus, the dissent 
argued that mandatory LWOP sentences are far from unusual but, to the 
contrary, are embraced by more than half of state legislatures.165 
The Miller majority responded to this argument by noting that many 
states did not have specific provisions for juvenile mandatory LWOP 
 
 154. See generally ASHLEY NELLIS & RYAN S. KING, NO EXIT:  THE EXPANDING USE OF 
LIFE SENTENCES IN AMERICA (2009), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/
publications/publications/inc_NoExitSept2009.pdf. 
 155. Id. at 31. 
 156. Id. (“This fact runs contrary to the commonly-held assumption that individuals 
serving LWOP sentences are chronic, repeat offenders.”). 
 157. Id. 
 158. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2478 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 159. Id. at 2477–78 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2022 (2010)). 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2023. 
 163. Id. at 2026.  “The Court explained that only 123 prisoners in the entire Nation were 
serving life without parole for nonhomicide crimes committed as juveniles.” Miller, 132 S. 
Ct. at 2478. 
 164. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2477. 
 165. Id. at 2478 (noting that mandatory LWOP for juvenile homicide offenders was a 
practice in twenty-nine states). 
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sentences.166  Many jurisdictions implicitly authorized juvenile LWOP 
through two separate statutory provisions, “often in . . . far-removed part[s] 
of the code”167—juvenile transfer to adult court and mandatory LWOP for 
homicide offenses.168  Depending on the offense committed, juvenile 
offenders may be transferred to adult court where they are then subject to 
the penalties and sentences given to adult offenders.169  The Court stated 
that although this “confluence” of state legislation created mandatory 
juvenile LWOP in twenty-nine states, it did not reflect that the sentence was 
in fact supported by full legislative consideration and deliberation.170  In 
light of the Court’s recent precedent regarding juvenile sentencing, the 
Court did not regard the existence of mandatory LWOP in twenty-nine 
states as indicating that societal standards pointed toward an acceptance of 
the harsh sentence, even for juvenile homicide offenders.171 
Furthermore, the Court noted that because Miller did not create a 
categorical ban on LWOP sentences, instead striking down any mandatory 
schemes that prevented the consideration of mitigating factors, any 
“tall[ying of] legislative enactments” was far less compelling.172  The Court 
did not foreclose the possibility that societal standards may point in favor of 
lifetime incarceration for the worst juvenile homicide offenders.173  The 
majority instead argued that there is no indication that state legislatures 
have expressly condoned LWOP sentences for juveniles without 
considering the mitigating qualities of youth and the nature of the offenses 
committed.174 
II.  MILLER AND GRAHAM CREATE CONFLICTING RESPONSES WHEN STATE 
COURTS ARE FACED WITH THE ISSUE OF VIRTUAL LWOP SENTENCES 
This Part examines state court responses to Miller and Graham with 
regard to virtual LWOP sentences.  Outside of California and Iowa, most 
state courts have not yet dealt with virtual LWOP sentences for juvenile 
homicide offenders.  As Part II.A discusses, California and Iowa state 
courts have struck down virtual LWOP sentences for homicide offenders, 
because they do not provide juvenile offenders with a meaningful 
opportunity for release.  Part II.B gives an overview of state court decisions 
regarding virtual LWOP sentences for nonhomicide offenders, including 
courts in Florida and Louisiana that have come down on both sides of the 
debate.  As articulated below, Florida state courts are divided on the issue 
of virtual LWOP sentences and what exactly constitutes geriatric release for 
juveniles.  This has created a question of when exactly a lengthy term-of-
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 168. Id. at 2473. 
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years sentence becomes LWOP and whether juveniles given these sentences 
should be considered LWOP offenders under Graham and Miller. 
The absence of any guidance for states as to how to apply Graham and 
Miller beyond the narrow confines of the mandatory LWOP sentence has 
created conflicting results in state courts and legislatures.  Despite the 
principle that “‘[t]he concept of proportionality is central to the Eighth 
Amendment,’”175 state court decisions have created virtual LWOP 
sentences that are highly disproportional considering the lower culpability 
of juvenile offenders.176 
A.  California and Iowa Recognize Virtual LWOP Sentences for Juvenile 
Homicide Offenders As Unconstitutional Under Miller 
Part II.A.1 looks at California’s response to virtual LWOP sentences for 
both nonhomicide and homicide offenders.  Part II.A.2 describes an Iowa 
state case that struck down virtual LWOP sentences under Miller.  Both 
states recognize that lengthy term-of-years sentences produce the same 
results as LWOP and warrant the same concerns as those seen in Miller. 
1.  California Recognizes Virtual LWOP Sentences for Both Nonhomicide 
and Homicide Offenders As Unconstitutional Under Graham and Miller 
After the Supreme Court struck down LWOP sentences for nonhomicide 
juvenile offenders in Graham, the California Supreme Court was faced with 
the question of virtual LWOP sentences in People v. Caballero.177  
Caballero was convicted of three counts of attempted murder and was 
sentenced to one term of forty years to life and two terms of thirty-five 
years to life, to be served consecutively.178  This resulted in a total sentence 
of 110 years to life.179  The Court considered whether Graham applied to 
Caballero’s de facto LWOP sentence despite the State’s argument that the 
sentence was constitutional because “each [sentence] included the 
possibility of parole within his lifetime.”180 
The California Supreme Court held that despite the State’s narrow 
reading of Graham, Caballero’s sentence violated the Eighth Amendment 
and constituted cruel and unusual punishment.181  The court looked behind 
Graham’s categorical ban on LWOP sentences for nonhomicide juvenile 
offenders and focused on the rationale that juvenile offenders must be 
treated distinctly for sentencing purposes.182  The court found that the 
distinct characteristics of juveniles that formed the basis for the Graham 
 
 175. Id. at 2463 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2021 (2010)). 
 176. See infra Part II.A–B. 
 177. 282 P.3d 291 (Cal. 2012). 
 178. Id. at 293. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 294. 
 181. Id. at 295. 
 182. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010) (“[B]ecause juveniles have 
lessened culpability they are less deserving of the most severe punishments.”). 
3458 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
decision supplied an equally important foundation for a categorical ban on 
virtual LWOP sentences.183 
Specifically, the court focused on Graham’s mandate that juvenile 
offenders must be provided a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release 
based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”184  The Caballero court 
concluded that because a virtual LWOP sentence denies such an 
opportunity, the categorical ban established in Graham applied to such 
sentences.185  Furthermore, the lack of penological justifications for LWOP 
sentences for juveniles, as outlined in Graham, applies equally to virtual 
LWOP sentences.186  The inability to deter juveniles, the lack of retribution 
due to lowered culpability, the high chance for reform that negates 
incapacitation, and the incompatibility of LWOP sentences with 
rehabilitation all apply with equal force to de facto LWOP sentences.187 
After the Caballero decision, California state courts were faced with the 
issue of virtual LWOP sentences that were given to juvenile homicide 
offenders.188  In People v. Ramirez,189 the California Fourth District Court 
of Appeal faced a constitutional challenge to a virtual LWOP sentence 
given to a juvenile offender following Miller.190  Both defendants in 
Ramirez faced virtual LWOP sentences for first- and second-degree 
murder.191  The Ramirez decision applied the Miller holding to de facto 
LWOP sentences for homicide offenders using the “juveniles are different” 
rationale articulated in Graham and later in Caballero.192  The California 
Fourth District Court of Appeals held that discretion and individualized 
sentencing are crucial for determining the appropriate punishment for 
juvenile offenders, regardless of the offense committed.193 
A major factor in the Ramirez decision was the statutory provision 
California Penal Code section 1170, enacted by the California legislature 
shortly before the case was decided.194  The court stated:  “Section 1170, 
subdivision (d)(2) provides, in substance, that when a juvenile is sentenced 
to LWOP . . . he is entitled to submit a petition for recall of his sentence 
 
 183. Caballero, 282 P.3d at 294–95. 
 184. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030. 
 185. Caballero, 282 P.3d at 295. 
 186. Id. at 298 (Werdegar, J., concurring) (“These concerns remain true whether the 
sentence is life without parole or a term of years exceeding the offender’s life expectancy.”). 
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 188. See People v. Ramirez, 162 Cal. Rptr. 3d 128 (Ct. App. 2013), review granted, 314 
P.3d 488 (Cal. 2013); People v. Perez, 154 Cal. Rptr. 3d 114 (Ct. App. 2013). 
 189. 162 Cal. Rptr. 3d 128. 
 190. Id. at 134. 
 191. Id. at 138.  Although Ramirez was originally sentenced to LWOP for the first-degree 
murder charge, the court noted that this sentence would have to be reversed in light of 
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 192. Id. at 152 (“[S]uch a sentence, which effectively precludes a defendant from ever 
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qualifies as cruel and unusual punishment.”). 
 193. Id. at 153. 
 194. Id. at 154–55. 
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after he has served at least 15 years.”195  The court viewed the recently 
enacted provision as a rejection of lengthy sentences constituting the 
equivalent of LWOP for juvenile offenders.196  It stated: 
[T]he very fact the Legislature has enacted that statutory provision 
suggests it does not endorse the imposition of unduly lengthy sentences 
against juvenile offenders, without at least ensuring they are afforded a 
meaningful opportunity to seek reconsideration of the sentence within 
some reasonable time, based on a demonstration of their positive 
character and rehabilitation.197 
The court further stated that in enacting section 1170, the California 
legislature was granting “parole-type review” to the worst juvenile 
offenders—those sentenced to LWOP.198  In doing so, the statute could not 
be read to exclude those juvenile offenders who were sentenced to 
“theoretically lesser”199 sentences from similar sentencing review based on 
remorse, maturity, and rehabilitation.200  Thus, although section 1170 only 
applies to LWOP sentences, the court read this to mean that if the worst 
juvenile offenders are eligible for release, all juveniles should be given the 
same opportunity.201 
The Ramirez decision acknowledges that, as articulated in Miller, there 
may be a rare juvenile offender who warrants a lifetime in prison.202  
However, the court, in light of California’s juvenile-sentencing scheme 
under section 1170, held that this determination should be made later in a 
juvenile offender’s sentence.203  The court noted that “trial courts are 
simply ill-equipped to make reliable lifetime judgments about juvenile 
offenders in the immediate wake of their convictions.”204  California took 
the mandate from Miller to consider the lesser culpability of juvenile 
homicide offenders in sentencing and applied the reasoning to all offenders 
regardless of the sentence given.205 
 
 
 195. Id. at 151 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(d)(2)(A)(i) (West Supp. 2014)).  The 
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2.  Iowa Supreme Court Strikes Down Lengthy Sentences for Juvenile 
Homicide Offenders 
The Iowa Supreme Court was faced with a unique response to Miller in 
State v. Ragland.206  The defendant under consideration in Ragland was 
convicted of first-degree murder for an offense committed when he was 
seventeen years old.207  Under a mandatory sentencing scheme in Iowa, the 
defendant was given LWOP.208  After the Miller decision came down, the 
governor of Iowa commuted the mandated LWOP sentences of thirty-eight 
juvenile homicide offenders in Iowa prison at the time, including Ragland, 
to life with no possibility for parole for sixty years.209  The defendant in 
Ragland appealed the sixty-year sentence, arguing that the commutation 
“was unconstitutional because it failed to follow the individualized 
considerations mandated by Miller.”210  Assuming that the governor had the 
authority to commute Ragland’s sentence, the court then analyzed whether 
the sixty-year sentence violated Miller.211 
The court first looked to whether the commuted sixty-year term 
constituted a mandatory sentence.212  The court determined that the 
commuted sentence was mandatory in nature, because it did not take into 
account the individual offender but simply changed the length of the 
sentence.213  In this regard, the Iowa governor simply substituted one 
sentence for another in order to avoid constitutional issues.214  No aspects 
of youth or any other factors were taken into account in the governor’s 
decision to commute the thirty-eight LWOP sentences.215  The court found, 
“Even with the commutation in 2012 by the Governor, Ragland has been 
deprived of the constitutional mandate that youths be sentenced pursuant to 
the Miller factors.”216  The court held that the Iowa governor could not 
circumvent Miller by simply shortening the sentence.217 
After concluding the mandatory nature of the commuted sentence, the 
Ragland court turned to the issue of de facto LWOP sentences under 
Miller.218  The defendant would not be eligible for parole until he reached 
the age of seventy-eight.219  Furthermore, “[u]nder standard mortality 
tables, his life expectancy [was] 78.6 years.”220  The defendant argued that 
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this was the functional equivalent of LWOP.221  The court agreed with 
Ragland and noted that “[f]or all practical purposes, the same motivation 
behind the mandates of Miller applie[d] to the commuted sentence in this 
case or any sentence that is the practical equivalent to life without 
parole.”222 
Notably, Ragland asserted that “[o]ftentimes, it is important that the 
spirit of the law not be lost in the application of the law.  This is one such 
time.”223  The court held that the same concerns in Miller applied with 
equal force to LWOP sentences and de facto LWOP sentences.224  The 
Ragland decision asserted that the mandate for individualized sentencing 
for juvenile homicide offenders in Miller was aimed at preventing all 
juveniles from spending their lives in prison.225 
On the same day, the Supreme Court of Iowa also considered State v. 
Null,226 a case in which a juvenile homicide offender had received a 
cumulative sentence of seventy-five years.227  The defendant argued that 
because he was sixteen years old at the time of the offense, and thus, his 
first chance for release would occur at age sixty-nine years and four 
months, his sentence constituted a de facto LWOP sentence that fell under 
the purview of Miller.228  The court held that the rationale of Miller and 
Graham included de facto LWOP sentences for juvenile homicide offenders 
and mandated that such offenders should be considered in the same way as 
those given LWOP.229 
As seen in the Ramirez decision, the Iowa court focused on the mandate 
from both Graham and Miller that juveniles be granted a “‘meaningful 
opportunity to obtain release’” based on lesser culpability and high chance 
for behavioral reform.230  Despite the State’s argument that the defendant 
would in fact be released from prison during his lifetime, rendering Miller 
inapplicable, the Iowa Supreme Court found this to be unavailing.231  
Instead, the court looked to what truly constituted a “meaningful 
opportunity” for release under Miller.232 
 
 221. Id. 
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According to the court’s rationale, Miller and Graham were clearly 
aimed at providing juvenile offenders the chance to rehabilitate themselves 
given the unique qualities of youth that create such a possibility.233  The 
court in Null was highly skeptical that release at the age of sixty-nine years 
old escaped the concerns of the Miller Court regarding juveniles spending a 
lifetime in prison.234  According to the Null court, “The prospect of geriatric 
release . . . does not provide a ‘meaningful opportunity’ to demonstrate the 
‘maturity and rehabilitation’ required to obtain release and reenter 
society.”235  The court also noted that this consideration was further 
complicated by life expectancy concerns.236  However, Null stressed that 
courts should not embark on an in-depth analysis of the actual life 
expectancy of the defendant.237  The principles of Miller and Graham 
dictate that most juveniles should be given the opportunity for release 
significantly before the end of their lifetime based on a showing of maturity 
and reform.238 
The Null court stressed that just as with the imposition of a mandatory 
LWOP sentence, discretion must be used to consider youth as a mitigating 
factor when aggregate term-of-years sentences combine to create virtual 
LWOP sentences for juvenile homicide offenders.239  The court took this 
one step further and held that Miller required “more than a generalized 
notion of taking age into consideration as a factor in sentencing.”240  Null 
directs trial courts to apply a “generally applicable rule” that juveniles are 
constitutionally different from adults.241 
If the trial court were to determine that a defendant represented a “rare or 
uncommon”242 juvenile incapable of reform, there must be more than “a 
mere recitation of the nature of the crime.”243  Instead, a court must give an 
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 237. Null, 836 N.W.2d at 72. 
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 242. Id. at 75. 
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in-depth analysis as to why the particular defendant falls outside the general 
rule that juveniles are undeserving of spending a lifetime in prison.244  The 
Iowa Supreme Court held that lower courts “must recognize that most 
juveniles who engage in criminal activity are not destined to become 
lifelong criminals.”245  On the contrary, the majority of juveniles should be 
given an opportunity for release and sentenced accordingly, regardless of 
the nature of their crime.246 
B.  Florida and Louisiana Decline To Extend  
Miller and Graham to Virtual LWOP Sentences 
In contrast to the decisions in California and Iowa, state courts in Florida 
and Louisiana have held that de facto LWOP sentences do not fall under 
Miller and thus do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.247  The 
cases discussed below deal with nonhomicide juvenile offenders as opposed 
to the homicide offenders in the California and Iowa cases.248  Applying 
Miller to both homicide and nonhomicide virtual LWOP has resulted in 
outcomes that are not only inconsistent but also raise proportionality issues 
under the Eighth Amendment.249  Juvenile nonhomicide offenders are 
forced to serve the equivalent of LWOP sentences, while juvenile homicide 
offenders are granted the protections under Miller that afford meaningful 
opportunity for release.  Part II.B.1 discusses a split in Florida state courts 
of appeals, and Part II.B.2 gives an overview of Louisiana court decisions 
that resulted in disproportional outcomes for juvenile nonhomicide 
offenders. 
1.  Florida District Courts Are Divided on Lengthy  
Term-of-Years Sentences Under Graham 
Florida state appellate courts are split on virtual LWOP sentences given 
to juvenile offenders.  The Fourth and Fifth District Courts of Appeals have 
held that, as a matter of law, virtual LWOP sentences do not violate the 
Eighth Amendment under Miller or Graham.  However, the First District 
Court of Appeals has recognized a lengthy term-of-years sentence as the 
equivalent of LWOP and struck down that virtual LWOP sentence as 
unconstitutional under Graham. 
In Henry v. State,250 the Fifth District Court of Appeals declined to 
extend the applicability of Graham in cases with virtual LWOP sentences 
given to nonhomicide juvenile offenders.251  The defendant had been 
sentenced to an aggregate term of ninety years for nonhomicide offenses.252  
 
 244. Id. at 74. 
 245. Id. at 75 (emphasis added). 
 246. Id. 
 247. See infra Part II.B.1–2. 
 248. See supra Part II.A. 
 249. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 250. 82 So. 3d 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
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The Henry court recognized the difficulty in adopting any bright-line rule to 
prohibit virtual LWOP sentences.253  The court noted that the exact point at 
which a lengthy term-of-years sentence becomes the equivalent of LWOP 
cannot be determined without drawing some sort of seemingly arbitrary line 
based on discretionary judgment calls.254  In Mediate v. State,255 the Fifth 
District was presented with a juvenile defendant who had been sentenced to 
a cumulative 130 years for kidnapping and four counts of sexual battery.256  
The court followed the earlier decision in Henry and upheld the virtual 
LWOP sentence.257 
Shortly after Mediate, the Fourth District Court of Appeals also refused 
to extend Graham to virtual LWOP sentences in the case of juvenile 
offenders in Guzman v. State.258  In Guzman, the defendant received a 
sixty-year sentence for nonhomicide offenses committed at the age of 
fourteen.259  Ultimately, the Fourth District followed the same line of 
reasoning that the Fifth District articulated in Mediate.260  Absent any 
language in Graham about de facto life sentences, the court found that the 
defendant’s sixty-year sentence was constitutional.261  The Guzman court 
certified two questions to the Florida Supreme Court:  “1. Does Graham v. 
Florida apply to lengthy term-of-years sentences that amount to de facto 
life sentences?  2. If so, at what point does a term-of-years sentence become 
a de facto life sentence?”262  These questions have been certified to the 
Florida Supreme Court on several other occasions,263 but the court has yet 
to respond or provide lower courts with otherwise meaningful guidance as 
to how to apply Graham to de facto LWOP sentences.264 
The Guzman court noted that the Florida Court of Appeals districts are 
split on this issue.265  Both the Fourth and Fifth Districts have declined to 
extend Graham to lengthy term-of-years sentences.266  However, the First 
District “has taken different approaches” to the issue of virtual LWOP 
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sentences under Graham.267  In Thomas v. State,268 the court held that a 
fifty-year sentence given to a seventeen-year-old for nonhomicide offenses 
was constitutional.269  The court stated, “While we agree that at some point, 
a term-of-years sentence may become the functional equivalent of a life 
sentence, we do not believe that situation has occurred in the instant 
case.”270 
In Gridine v. State,271 the First District echoed the Thomas opinion and 
held that although a term-of-years sentence will at some point become the 
equivalent of an LWOP sentence, a seventy-year sentence given to a 
fourteen-year-old offender did not create that situation.272  This seems to be 
in direct contrast with the Iowa Supreme Court’s interpretation of Graham 
and Miller, which deemed geriatric release as violating Graham’s mandate 
to provide meaningful release to juvenile offenders in Null.273 
However, Judge Wolf’s dissenting opinion in Gridine argued that the 
appellant would spend the rest of his life in prison, thus violating “the spirit, 
if not the letter, of the Graham decision.”274  Judge Wolf’s dissent appeared 
to follow the rationale of the Iowa and California cases that extended Miller 
to de facto LWOP sentences.275  Nevertheless, Judge Wolf also noted that 
absent any statutory provisions on juvenile parole from the Florida 
legislature, the Florida Supreme Court would have to guidance to the lower 
courts on how to apply Graham in the larger context of lengthy 
sentences.276 
One year later, the First District Court of Appeals changed its tune.  In 
Floyd v. State,277 the defendant was sentenced to eighty years in prison on 
two counts of armed robbery committed at the age of seventeen.278  The 
court addressed the prior cases that upheld similar sentences as 
constitutional but disagreed with the holding that “a lengthy term-of-years 
sentence cannot constitute the functional equivalent of a life sentence 
without parole.”279  In Floyd, the defendant would not have been released 
until he was ninety-seven years old, ensuring a lifetime in prison.280  The 
court determined that by sentencing the defendant to eighty years in prison, 
the trial court had foreclosed any possibility that the defendant would 
eventually be refit to enter society.281  The First District held that this 
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violated Graham and was therefore unconstitutional, seemingly reaching 
the point at which a lengthy sentence became the equivalent of LWOP.282 
The division among the Florida State District Courts of Appeals is further 
complicated by the manner in which certain districts have dealt with LWOP 
sentences under Miller.  In Horsley v. State,283 the Fifth District Court of 
Appeals struck down an LWOP sentence given to a defendant convicted of 
a first-degree murder that he committed at the age of seventeen.284  In doing 
so, the court held that Florida statute section 775.082 was unconstitutional 
under Miller.285  Section 775.082 stated that the only available sentences 
for capital murder are mandatory LWOP and capital punishment.286  The 
court noted that although other district courts of appeals in Florida had 
recognized the problem with section 775.082 after Miller, “none of them 
[had] given definitive direction to trial courts regarding the available 
sentencing alternatives after Miller.”287 
Horsley held that through statutory revival, courts should sentence 
juvenile homicide offenders to life with the possibility of parole after 
twenty-five years.288  The 1993 version of Florida Statutes section 
775.082(1) included such a provision.289  This concept was first articulated 
in a concurring opinion from the First District regarding a juvenile 
homicide offender sentenced to LWOP.290  The Horsley court noted that the 
judiciary was left with no current statutory alternatives after Miller had 
rendered section 775.082 unconstitutional291: 
[T]he judiciary’s role in a case like this—where a legislative enactment is 
declared unconstitutional and the alternative of having no option to 
address the subject would be untenable—is largely guided by the doctrine 
of separation of powers.  In other words, the judiciary is attempting to fill 
a statutory gap while remaining as faithful as possible to expressed 
legislative intent, but also attempting to avoid judicial intermeddling by 
crafting our own statute to address the issue with original language.292 
Thus, Horsley held that the 1993 version of section 775.082 must be 
revived.293  By adopting this ruling, the court was avoiding any attempt to 
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rewrite section 775.082 in original language, a decision that would likely be 
considered legislating from the bench.294 
The court further stated, “We also strongly believe that many of the 
considerations outlined in Miller would be far better addressed years after 
sentencing in a parole-type setting, once the juvenile has matured into an 
adult and his or her conduct during decades of confinement has been 
evaluated.”295  This statement seems puzzling in light of decisions like 
Mediate in the Fifth District that declined to extend parole eligibility to 
juvenile nonhomicide offenders given virtual LWOP sentences.296  Thus, 
the Fifth District has advocated for a revival of a statute that would ensure 
parole eligibility for juvenile homicide offenders after twenty-five years but 
has upheld virtual LWOP sentences for nonhomicide offenders.  The 
division among Florida courts regarding parole eligibility under Miller and 
Graham has created occasions in which juvenile homicide offenders are 
given parole opportunities after serving twenty-five years of their sentence, 
but nonhomicide offenders must serve sixty years or more without any hope 
of release. 
2.  Louisiana Declines To Extend Graham 
 to Lengthy Term-of-Years Sentences 
In State v. Brown,297 the Supreme Court of Louisiana also invoked a 
narrow reading of Graham’s holding.298  In Brown, the defendant was 
convicted of aggravated kidnapping and armed robbery.299  The defendant 
received an LWOP sentence for the aggravated kidnapping charge and four 
consecutive ten-year sentences for the armed robbery charges.300  The court 
evaluated a forty-year sentence with no parole eligibility as a virtual LWOP 
sentence that the defendant challenged under Graham’s holding.301 
The district court overturned both the LWOP sentence and the forty-year 
cumulative sentence under Graham.302  The intermediate court reversed the 
decision only with regard to the armed robbery sentences, and the Louisiana 
Supreme Court granted review of the case to determine whether the 
consecutive sentences were permissible under Graham.303  In this case, 
based on the State’s calculations, the defendant would receive a sentence of 
seventy years and would be eligible for parole at age eighty-six.304 
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As explained in Brown, the Louisiana state legislature had amended its 
sentencing laws to comply with Graham.305  Section 15:574.4(D)(1) of the 
Louisiana Revised Statutes states that any juvenile offender serving a life 
sentence may be eligible for parole after serving thirty years.306  However, 
the court noted that the revised statutes did not cover the issue at hand and 
thus provided no parole requirements for lengthy term-of-years 
sentences.307 
The Louisiana Supreme Court noted that absent any clear direction from 
the U.S. Supreme Court on de facto LWOP sentences, “state courts are left 
to grapple with sentences such as the one possibly at issue here, i.e., a term 
of years that may exceed the life span of the defendant.”308  The Brown 
decision focused on the limited holding of Graham and the absence of any 
application outside of LWOP sentences:  “[W]e see nothing in Graham that 
even applies to sentences for multiple convictions, as Graham conducted no 
analysis of sentences for multiple convictions and provides no guidance on 
how to handle such sentences.”309 
Based on the lack of guidance in Graham, the Louisiana Supreme Court 
reversed the lower court’s decision to remove the parole eligibility 
restrictions on the four consecutive ten-year sentences.310  The court also 
cited Justice Alito’s dissent in Graham, which had declined to extend the 
rationale behind prohibiting LWOP sentences to lengthy term-of-years 
sentences.311  The Brown decision created a situation in which a juvenile 
offender sentenced to LWOP will be eligible for parole earlier, after thirty 
years in this particular case, than a juvenile offender sentenced to a term-of-
years constituting virtual LWOP. 
This conflict is further evident when considering the multiple cases in 
Louisiana that have remanded LWOP sentences for juvenile homicide 
offenders.312  On at least three separate occasions, Louisiana courts have 
overturned LWOP sentences given to juvenile offenders convicted of 
second-degree murder based on the absence of the consideration of the 
mitigating factors described in Miller in the sentencing courts’ decisions.313  
The courts “grant[ed] remand . . . to reconsider the sentence after 
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conducting a new sentencing hearing in accordance with the principles 
enunciated in Miller v. Alabama.”314  Yet, a juvenile nonhomicide offender 
subject to a lengthy sentence was not granted the same remand of his 
sentence so that a sentencing court could consider his individual 
characteristics and qualities of youth.315 
Ultimately, these holdings have led to outcomes in which juvenile 
homicide offenders may be eligible for parole far before juvenile 
nonhomicide offenders who are sentenced to lengthy term-of-years 
sentences that result in the equivalent of LWOP.316  The juvenile offenders 
in Mediate, Henry, and Guzman are, at the time of publishing, serving 
lengthy sentences constituting virtual LWOP for nonhomicide offenses.317  
Yet homicide juvenile offenders serving de facto LWOP sentences were 
granted reprieve in California and Iowa state courts under Miller.318 
III.  CALIFORNIA DIRECTLY ADDRESSES VIRTUAL LWOP SENTENCES, 
WHILE LEGISLATIVE REFORM IN OTHER STATES FAILS TO ADEQUATELY 
ENACT COMPREHENSIVE JUVENILE SENTENCING REFORM 
As several authors have noted, the issue of virtual LWOP sentences 
under Graham creates constitutional questions and likely invites arbitrary 
line drawing as to how long a sentence must be to trigger constitutional 
protections against LWOP under Graham and Miller.319  This Note 
proposes that the only adequate manner in which states can address both 
LWOP and virtual LWOP given to all juvenile offenders is through 
statutory provisions that remove parole restrictions from juvenile offenders. 
Several states have taken actions toward compliance with Miller and 
Graham by enacting statutory revisions that provide an opportunity for 
resentencing and parole for those juvenile offenders sentenced to LWOP or 
life imprisonment.320  These statutes set forth certain requirements that 
must be met for inmates who were sentenced to LWOP for crimes 
committed as juveniles to become eligible for resentencing and possibly 
parole.321  As Part III outlines, states including Louisiana and Wyoming 
have enacted this type of legislation, although the states vary on how many 
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years of an LWOP sentence an offender must serve before he or she 
becomes eligible for reconsideration.322 
Unfortunately, these statutes do not apply to offenders outside of those 
who were explicitly sentenced to LWOP or life imprisonment.323  Thus, 
although the statutory revisions discussed below are in compliance with 
Miller and Graham, they do not adequately address the issue of lengthy 
term-of-years sentences that constitute virtual LWOP.  However, as 
explained in Part III.B, other states, including Montana, already had 
statutory provisions in place that remove parole restrictions from any 
sentence given to a juvenile offender before the Miller decision.  This type 
of law ensures that juveniles will at least be eligible for release and that a 
sentencing court can make the determination at a later point as to whether a 
juvenile falls among the limited number of offenders who deserve life in 
prison.324  Removing parole restrictions for all juvenile offenders, 
regardless of the offense committed or the sentence given, may be the only 
viable method of confronting the issue of virtual LWOP sentences.  Part 
III.B also discusses the comprehensive juvenile sentencing reform in 
California that directly takes into account virtual LWOP sentences after 
Caballero. 
A.  Louisiana and Wyoming Respond to Graham and Miller  
Through Statutory Reform Providing Juveniles  
Sentenced to LWOP with Some Hope for Release 
Part III.A.1 provides an overview of Louisiana’s sentencing reform post-
Miller and explains why the state’s statute that pertains to juvenile homicide 
offenders may be inadequate to provide opportunities for parole.  Part 
III.A.2 discusses a similar Wyoming statute enacted to provide the potential 
for parole for all juvenile offenders, regardless of the offense.  The 
Wyoming statute also only applies to juvenile LWOP offenders, and while 
it represents a comprehensive response to Miller, it does not address the 
issues posed by virtual LWOP. 
1.  Louisiana Provides Parole Eligibility for  
Homicide Offenders Only Prior to Sentencing 
The Louisiana State Senate eliminated parole restrictions on life 
sentences for juvenile offenders who committed nonhomicide offenses.325  
Under section 15:574.4 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes, any juvenile 
offender serving a life sentence for a nonhomicide offense is eligible for 
parole after serving thirty years of his or her sentence.326  To qualify for 
parole eligibility, a three-person panel must consider the offender.327  This 
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 327. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:574.4(D)(2). 
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panel is provided with a written evaluation from an “expert[] in adolescent 
brain development.”328 
Recent statutory revisions in Louisiana also include a provision that 
provides parole eligibility for juvenile homicide offenders convicted of 
first- or second-degree murder.329  Offenders that have served thirty-five 
years of their life sentence may be entitled to parole “if a judicial 
determination has been made that the person is entitled to parole eligibility 
pursuant to Code of Criminal Procedure Article 878.1.”330  Article 878.1 
mandates that any juvenile convicted of first- or second-degree murder must 
be subject to a hearing prior to sentencing to determine parole eligibility on 
a sentence of life imprisonment.331  Juvenile offenders may present 
mitigating factors332 to establish if they qualify for parole eligibility.333  
The statute parrots the Miller decision in mandating that “[s]entences 
imposed without parole eligibility should normally be reserved for the 
worst offenders and the worst cases.”334 
Although Louisiana provides juvenile homicide offenders sentenced to 
life imprisonment with some chance for release, this opportunity only arises 
before sentencing, pursuant to article 878.1.335  As outlined above, 
sentencing courts are likely not well equipped to make decisions about a 
juvenile’s potential for reform at this early stage.336  Miller did not rule out 
the possibility that some juveniles may fall into the category of offenders 
meriting a lifetime in prison; however, the spirit of both Miller and Graham 
suggest that this determination should be made later, after the mitigating 
characteristics of youth can no longer account for criminal behavior.337 
Furthermore, section 15.574.4 only applies to life sentences and does not 
address any juveniles, such as the defendant in Brown,338 who may have 
been sentenced to lengthy term-of-years sentences, which can potentially 
span much longer than thirty-five years with no parole eligibility until the 
end of the sentence.  In this regard, Louisiana has not provided a solution to 
the virtual LWOP sentences problem. 
 
 
 328. Id. 
 329. Id. § 15:574.4(E)(1). 
 330. Id. 
 331. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 878.1(A) (Supp. 2014). 
 332. Id. art. 878.1(B) (mitigating factors outlined in § 878.1 include those discussed in 
Miller:  “the offender’s level of family support [and] social history”). 
 333. Id. 
 334. Id. 
 335. Id. art. 878.1(A). 
 336. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 337. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 338. See supra Part II.B.2. 
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2.  Wyoming Allows Juveniles an Opportunity for Parole  
After Twenty-Five Years Served Regardless of the Offense 
Wyoming also enacted sentencing reform after the Supreme Court’s ban 
on mandatory juvenile LWOP sentences from Miller.339  In 2013, the 
Wyoming State legislature amended several statutory provisions through 
House Bill 23 (H.B. 23), effectively eliminating juvenile LWOP.340  Prior 
to H.B. 23, section 6-2-101 of the Wyoming Statutes mandated a sentence of 
LWOP for first-degree murder.341  Through H.B. 23, section 6-2-101 was 
amended to include an exception for juvenile offenders convicted of first-
degree murder for whom the statutory punishment is now a sentence of life 
imprisonment.342  H.B. 23 also amended section 6-10-301, the Wyoming 
statute that previously prohibited parole for offenders serving LWOP or life 
imprisonment unless the governor commuted the sentence to a term of 
years.343 
A juvenile offender is now eligible for parole after serving twenty-five 
years of their sentence regardless of the offense committed under section 6-
10-301.344  The only exceptions outlined in section 6-10-301 are for those 
offenders who assaulted any employee of a correctional institution with a 
deadly weapon or who attempted to escape from incarceration while serving 
their sentence.345  This statutory provision seems to follow the logic 
articulated in Miller that nothing the Supreme Court said in Graham 
regarding juvenile culpability is “crime specific.”346 
In contrast to the similar legislation in Louisiana, no specific factors or 
requirements are listed in section 6-10-301 for a juvenile to be considered 
eligible for parole in front of a sentencing or parole board.347  This may 
prove to be a lower bar for juvenile offenders when petitioning a parole 
board for release.  On the other hand, the parole board may simply be 
allotted more discretion in making its determination about the eligibility of 
the offender.  In either case, section 6-10-301 only applies to juvenile 
 
 339. See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-10-301(c) (2013). 
 340. H.B. 23, 62nd Leg., 2013 Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2013), available at 
http://legisweb.state.wy.us/2013/Enroll/HB0023.pdf (“An Act relating to crimes and 
offenses; modifying provisions relating to life sentences for juvenile offenders generally; 
eliminating life sentences without parole for juvenile offenders; and providing for an 
effective date.”). 
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 344. Id. (“A person sentenced to life imprisonment for an offense committed before the 
person reached the age of eighteen (18) years shall be eligible for parole after commutation 
of his sentence to a term of years or after having served twenty-five (25) years of 
incarceration.”). 
 345. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-13-402(b) (2013) (stating that those juvenile offenders who, 
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 346. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465 (2012). 
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offenders sentenced to life imprisonment and, like the Louisiana statutes, 
does not adequately address virtual LWOP. 
B.  Statutory Schemes in Montana and California May Present  
Potential Solutions to Virtual LWOP Sentences 
Part III.B.1 looks at a Montana state law enacted prior to Graham and 
Miller that may present a potential solution to the issue of virtual LWOP 
sentences not seen in statutory responses post Miller.  The Montana statute 
removes parole restrictions for all juvenile offenders.  Part III.B.2 discusses 
California Penal Code section 1170, mentioned above in Part II, in detail 
and the multiple opportunities juvenile offenders may have for resentencing 
and parole.  Part III.B.2 also looks at Senate Bill 260 in California, recently 
signed into law in September 2013.  Senate Bill 260 directly addresses the 
issue of virtual LWOP and represents the only comprehensive statutory 
reform specifically aimed at resolving issues posed by lengthy term-of-
years sentences given to both homicide and nonhomicide juvenile 
offenders. 
1.  The Montana Statute May Present a Solution to the  
Issue of Virtual LWOP Sentences for All Juvenile Offenders 
Montana’s Code of Criminal Procedure provides an opportunity for 
release for all juvenile offenders regardless of the crime or the nature of the 
sentence imposed.348  Although this statutory provision was not enacted in 
response to Graham or Miller, Montana’s treatment of juvenile offenders 
addresses both the issue of homicide versus nonhomicide offenders and de 
facto LWOP sentences.  Section 46-18-222 of the Montana Code provides 
an exception to mandatory life sentences for offenders who committed 
offenses while under the age of eighteen.349  This exception applies to all 
juvenile offenders, regardless of the offense committed.350  This statute 
does not differentiate between nonhomicide and homicide juvenile 
offenders.351  Furthermore, section 46-18-222 removes the “restrictions on 
parole eligibility” for all juvenile offenders.352  Thus, a juvenile sentenced 
to a lengthy term-of-years sentence constituting the equivalent of LWOP 
would be eligible for parole under this statute. 
This would directly impact offenders such as the defendant in State v. 
Brown, who was faced with a forty-year sentence with no parole despite 
Miller’s mandate that all juveniles receive an opportunity for release.353  
Courts would not be able to circumvent Miller’s ban on mandatory LWOP 
 
 348. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-222 (West Supp. 2013). 
 349. Id. (“Mandatory minimum sentences prescribed by the laws of this state, mandatory 
life sentences . . . and restrictions on parole eligibility . . . do not apply if:  (1) the offender 
was less than 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense for which the 
offender is to be sentenced . . . .”). 
 350. See id. 
 351. See id. 
 352. See id. 
 353. See supra Part II.B.2. 
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sentences by upholding lengthy term-of-years sentences that ensure a 
lifetime in prison for juvenile offenders under a statutory provision such as 
that enacted in Montana.  The Montana statute still leaves open the 
possibility that the rare juvenile homicide offender who shows no capability 
of reform will spend the remainder of his or her life in prison.  The 
availability of parole does not guarantee that parole will be granted.  To 
ensure that the worst offenders are not guaranteed parole, requirements such 
as those seen in California Penal Code section 1170 could be listed in a 
juvenile parole statute to implement the Miller holding.354  However, these 
requirements pose problems for those juveniles who may be deserving of 
resentencing or even release but are unable to demonstrate that they meet 
the extensive list of requirements. 
2.  California Gives Juvenile LWOP Offenders  
Multiple Chances for Resentencing and Enacts  
Comprehensive Reform To Address Virtual LWOP 
California enacted comprehensive juvenile sentencing reforms in 
response to Miller and Graham.  The California State legislature passed the 
“Fair Sentencing for Youth Act” in September of 2012 in the wake of the 
Miller decision.355  As a response to Miller’s mandate to provide juveniles 
with a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release,”356 the Fair Sentencing 
for Youth Act gives all juvenile offenders with LWOP sentences multiple 
opportunities for parole eligibility.357  Juvenile defendants may petition for 
a recall of an LWOP sentence after serving fifteen years.358  The offender 
may be either resentenced or granted parole.359  If, after the sentencing 
court has considered the defendant’s potential for rehabilitation, the 
offender is not recalled for resentencing, the defendant may repetition for 
review after serving twenty, twenty-four, and twenty-five years of an 
LWOP sentence.360  As evidenced by the California Senate’s legislative 
history for section 1170, this sentencing scheme in California also follows 
the insistence of the Miller Court that the logic of Graham apply to all 
juvenile offenders, regardless of the crime committed.361  Thus, juvenile 
homicide offenders are given the same opportunities to reform as those 
juveniles convicted of nonhomicide offenses. 
 
 354. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(d)(2)(F) (West Supp. 2014). 
 355. S.B. 9, 2012 Leg. (Ca. 2012), available at http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/
billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201120120SB9 (codified at CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170 (West 
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 356. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010). 
 357. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(d)(2). 
 358. Id. § 1170(d)(2)(A)(i). 
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 360. Id. § 1170(d)(2)(H). 
 361. See SENATE FLOOR REP. ON S.B. 9, S.B. 9, 2011–2012 Sess., at 11 (Ca. 2012), 
available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/sen/sb_0001-0050/sb_9_cfa_2012
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Although section 1170 seems to take large steps toward incorporating 
Miller’s holding into state law, the statute “hardly throws open the prison 
doors for all violent offenders.”362  Prisoners who were convicted of 
offenses committed as juveniles must meet several criteria demonstrating 
remorse and rehabilitation.363  Even after this consideration, resentencing is 
entirely at the discretion of the sentencing court.364  In fact, proponents of 
the California statute concede that those juveniles eligible for resentencing 
after years in prison are likely small in number.365  Furthermore, juvenile 
offenders subject to resentencing are not ensured parole.366  In reality, 
section 1170 “will probably only benefit a small percentage of inmates, 
those whose crimes were so grave that they were given LWOP sentences, 
but whose actions were more the result of adolescent delinquency rather 
than inherent evil.”367  However, Miller did not foreclose the possibility 
that LWOP may be an appropriate sentence for some juvenile homicide 
offenders who are beyond reform.368  Thus, section 1170 complies with 
Miller in providing juvenile offenders the opportunity for parole but may 
not actually be effective in providing any meaningful chance at 
rehabilitation and release for the majority of juvenile LWOP offenders. 
As seen with both the Louisiana and Wyoming statutes, section 1170 
only applies to those juveniles sentenced to LWOP.369  Under all three 
statutory schemes, a juvenile homicide offender sentenced to LWOP or life 
imprisonment will be provided opportunities for parole at various stages in 
his sentence.  However, potential exists that a juvenile offender convicted 
of either nonhomicide or homicide offenses, who is sentenced to a lengthy 
term-of-years sentence, will not be eligible for parole.  This is especially 
true in states like Louisiana where courts have upheld virtual LWOP 
sentences as outside the scope of Graham and Miller and thus have upheld 
parole restrictions, ensuring that the offender spends the majority or entirety 
of his or her life in prison.370 
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The California State legislature has continued to enact sentencing reform 
that responds directly not only to Miller but also to People v. Caballero and 
the issue of de facto LWOP sentences given to juvenile offenders.  In 
September 2013, California Governor Jerry Brown signed Senate Bill 260 
(S.B. 260),371 which addresses juvenile offenders given lengthy sentences 
outside of LWOP.  S.B. 260 “requires the state parole board to consider 
releasing juvenile offenders who have served at least 15 years of a long 
sentence.”372  S.B. 260 creates “youth offender parole hearing[s]” for any 
juvenile offender given a lengthy prison sentence.373  Furthermore, S.B. 260 
directly codifies the central holdings of Miller and Graham by mandating 
that youth offender parole boards “shall provide for a meaningful 
opportunity to obtain release.”374  Parole boards considering offenders who 
were convicted as juveniles are instructed to take growth, maturity, and “the 
diminished culpability of juveniles as compared to adults” into account.375 
S.B. 260 added section 3051 to the California Penal Code, creating 
provisions for youth offender parole hearings.376  Under the provisions of 
section 3051, any juvenile offender who is still incarcerated after serving 
fifteen years of his or her “determinate” or term-of-years sentence becomes 
parole eligible.377  A juvenile offender sentenced to a life term of less than 
twenty-five years to life becomes eligible for parole before a youth offender 
parole hearing during his of her twentieth year of incarceration.378  Finally, 
a juvenile offender given a life sentence of twenty-five years to life is 
eligible for parole during his or her twenty-fifth year of that sentence.379 
Section 1 of S.B. 260 describes the legislative intent behind the bill: 
The purpose of this act is to establish a parole eligibility mechanism that 
provides a person serving a sentence for crimes that he or she committed 
as a juvenile the opportunity to obtain release when he or she has shown 
that he or she has been rehabilitated and gained maturity, in accordance 
with the decision of the California Supreme Court in People v. Caballero 
and the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Graham v. 
Florida and Miller v. Alabama.380 
The mention of People v. Caballero seems to indicate that the legislature 
was directly addressing the issue of virtual LWOP sentences after the 
California Supreme Court held that virtual LWOP must be considered in the 
 
 371. S.B. 260, 2013 Leg., 2013–2014 Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2013), available at 
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same manner as LWOP under Graham.381  Section 1 further mentions 
Miller and thus incorporates the Caballero rationale to extend to all juvenile 
offenders, including those convicted of homicide.382  Juveniles convicted of 
LWOP are exempt from S.B. 260, further indicating that the bill was aimed 
at comprehensive sentencing reform that takes virtual LWOP into 
account.383 
The California legislature takes sentencing reform a step further in S.B. 
260 and sets up early mechanisms for inmates that further promote 
rehabilitation and a “meaningful opportunity for release.”384  Section 2 of 
S.B. 260 amends California Penal Code section 3041 and mandates that the 
Board of Parole Hearings meet with inmates six years prior to the minimum 
date of parole eligibility.385  These meetings are conducted for the 
“purposes of reviewing and documenting the inmate’s activities and 
conduct pertinent to both parole eligibility and to the granting or 
withholding of post conviction credit.”386  The Board is required to inform 
the inmate of the details of the parole hearing process and of specific 
information regarding the individual’s suitability for parole.387  Section 
3041 thus follows the mandate to provide a meaningful opportunity to 
release, as articulated in Miller and its progeny.  Juvenile offenders will be 
informed early in their sentences about the requirements for parole and how 
to meet them.388  The board considers such factors as “work assignments, 
rehabilitative programs, and institutional behavior.”389 
Finally, S.B. 260 created California Penal Code section 4801(c), which 
gives guidance to the Board of Parole Hearings on the manner in which 
youth should be taken into account in the parole context.390  The newly 
amended section 4801(c) instructs the board to “give great weight to the 
diminished culpability of juveniles as compared to adults, the hallmark 
features of youth, and any subsequent growth and increased maturity of the 
prisoner in accordance with relevant case law.”391  S.B. 260 represents a 
comprehensive effort on the part of the California State legislature to 
address the issues created by virtual LWOP sentences, as seen initially in 
Caballero with juvenile nonhomicide offenders.  The new parole system 
created for juvenile inmates with lengthy sentences further incorporates 
juvenile homicide offenders with virtual LWOP sentences, such as the 
defendant in Ramirez.  S.B. 260 gives parole boards until July 1, 2015, to 
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comply with the statutory revisions and complete parole hearings to those 
offenders eligible for parole consideration under S.B. 260.392 
Opponents of statutory reform like S.B. 260 may argue that this type of 
sentencing reform goes too far in ensuring release for what potentially may 
be the worst violent juvenile offenders.  Specifically, opponents have noted 
that eliminating parole restrictions for all juvenile offenders likely places an 
undue burden on the families of the victims, especially with regard to 
juvenile homicide offenders.393  Statutory schemes that provide for multiple 
opportunities for inmates to be considered for parole may force families of 
victims or, in some cases of severe nonhomicide crimes, the victims 
themselves, to relive the experience over and over again.  This is likely 
especially true if states are to enact statutory reform similar to that in 
California, where juvenile offenders have multiple opportunities to obtain 
parole during lengthy sentences. 
Although these concerns about the practical implications of statutory 
reform such as S.B. 260 or statutes similar to section 46-18-222 of 
Montana’s Code of Criminal Procedure are certainly valid, removing 
restrictions on parole eligibility for juvenile offenders may be the only valid 
way to avoid arbitrary line-drawing problems that apply to virtual LWOP.  
Furthermore, statutes like S.B. 260 ensure that juvenile nonhomicide 
offenders will not be left serving more time than juvenile homicide 
offenders because of a virtual LWOP sentence.  By providing inmates who 
were convicted as juveniles with multiple opportunities at various stages of 
their lengthy sentences, a sentencing court or a parole board will not be 
asked to determine exactly at what point a lengthy term-of-years sentence 
becomes LWOP.  Instead, juvenile offenders are given equal opportunity 
for reform and the parole board must determine whether or not each 
offender represents the rare juvenile homicide offender who may be beyond 
reform and must spend the remainder of his or her life in prison. 
CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, virtual LWOP sentences given to juvenile offenders pose the 
same issues considered with mandatory LWOP sentences in Miller.  By 
refusing to extend the holdings of Miller and Graham to virtual LWOP, 
state courts have created situations in which juveniles convicted of 
homicide may be eligible for parole before nonhomicide juvenile offenders 
in the same state.  State legislatures should take this problem into account 
when drafting statutory revisions to comply with Miller and Graham.  If 
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virtual LWOP sentences are not incorporated into sentencing laws, state 
courts may have to embark on some sort of arbitrary determination as to 
how long a sentence must be in order to constitute virtual LWOP.  This 
would inevitably include some life expectancy calculations, which, as 
articulated above, are likely impossible based on demographic factors and 
on the effect that prison may have on life span.  To avoid this potentially 
problematic analysis, states can include provisions that provide for parole at 
certain stages of lengthy sentences regardless of the offense committed or 
the sentence imposed. 
Statutory reform that deals directly with juveniles sentenced to LWOP or 
life imprisonment, such as that enacted in Louisiana and Wyoming, does 
not adequately address the constitutional questions that arise with juvenile 
offenders sentenced to virtual LWOP.  In order to avoid circumstances in 
which a juvenile nonhomicide offender sentenced to LWOP is eligible for 
parole later than a juvenile homicide offender given a sentence of LWOP or 
life, states must either remove all parole restrictions on juvenile offenders or 
create opportunities for parole for lengthy term-of-years sentences.  
Following either the reforms of the California State legislature or the 
Montana statute that ensures parole eligibility for all juveniles, states will 
likely be able to avoid any constitutional issues surrounding juveniles given 
virtual LWOP sentences. 
